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EXTENSION OF LIABILITY OF ABSTRACTERS
The General Rule.-In i90o a standard encyclopedia said: "By
the weight of authority an abstracter is liable only to the person
ordering and paying for the abstract; and where this view obtains,
the fact that an abstracter has knowledge that his abstract is to be
used in a sale or loan to advise a purchaser or person about to lend
money does not affect the rule as to his liability. In some jurisdictions, however, the abstracter's liability has been extended to protect those who, relying on the correctness of the abstract, are injured."'
In 1914 another excellent encyclopedia asserted: "While there is
some apparent and perhaps actual conflict of authority upon the
question, the general rule is that the liability of an abstracter extends only to the person employimg him, or to one who is a party
or privy to the contract of employment, and this rule seems to be
unquestioned in cases where the abstractor has no knowledge that the
abstract is intended for the information or use .of another; but the
general rule is not without exctptions, and there are cases where,
under certain circumstances, the liability has been extended to persons other than those directly employing the abstracter, who are
injured by reliance upon the abstract; although it seems, and has
been so stated, that these cases are based upon peculiar circumstances
and are not in conflict with the general rule. Under some statutes
the liability upon the bond reqtfired of abstracters is expressly extended to persons other than those employing them."'
Basis of _General Rule.-The general rule respecting the persons
to whom an abstracter is liable for loss resulting from reliance upon
his negligently erroneous abstract of title undoubtedly is supported
s
by the great weight of numerical authority. The view that only
I Cyc.

21
Corpus Juris 369-70.
'National Savings 'Bank v. Ward, too U. S. xqS, as r- ed. 6"2z; Dundee Mtg. etc.
Co. v. HugheZ, 20 Fed: 39; Talpey v. Wright, 6z Ark. 275, 32 S. W. 1072. S4 Am. St.
Rep. 2o6; Mechanics' Bldg. Assoc. v. Whiteacre, 92 Ind. 547; Allen v. Hopkins, 62 Kan.
175, 6z Pac. 750; Mallory v. Ferguson, so Kan. 685, 32 Pac. 410. 22 L. I. A. 99; Symns
2

v. Cutter, 9 Kan. A. 2,o, 59 Pac. 67t; Schade v. Gehner, 733 Mo. 252, 34 S. W.

576;

Clark v. Marshall, 34 Mo. 429; Zweigardt v. Birdseye, 57 Mo. A. 462; Security Abstract
of Title Ca. v. Longacre, 56 Neb. 469, 76 N. W. 1073; Glawatz v. Peoples Guaranty
Search Co., 49 App. Div. 465, 63 N. Y. S. 691; Lockwood v. New York Title Ins Co.,
73 Misc. 296, 130 N. Y. S. 824; Thomas v. Guarantee Title, etc., Co., 81 Ohio St. 432, 91
K. E. x83, z6 L. R. A. N. S. z21o; Equitable Building, etc., Assoc. v. Bank of Commerce
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'those who are parties or privies to the contract employing an abstracter can recover from him is based (i) on the old view of the
invariable necessity of privity of contract to support an action ex
contract% and (2) on the denial of any action ex delicto. For the
most part, the decisions upholding this view are dogmatic. They are
based on authority-the ipse dixit of the past. They speak the
language of a time when courts, obliged to choose, were prone to
prefer legal form before justice, aftd when abstracters played little,
if any, part in business negotiations. "The abstracter is not bound
to know," say a majority of the courts, "that his certificate is for the
use or reliance of any one but the person who receives it, nor can
it be assumed that he gives it for any other tise. He contracts with
the persor who requests it and pays for.it to give a certificate which
shall state the facts, but he enters into no relation of contract or
otherwise in respect to it with any other person, and if another
relies upon it to his injury, he cannot have redress."'
Vendor's Duty to Furnish Abstract.-The consequences of this
severely technical rule become more obvious and deplorable when
it is considered that in England the vendor is bound to furnish at
his own expense an abstract of every material document of title
after the date fixed for the commencement of title;5 and in a few
American decisions the same :xlue seems to have been followed.
By the great weight of American authority, however, the vendor of
land is not required to furnish the vendee an abstract of title in the
absence of a specific agreement therefor.7 Nevertheless, either because of contract or custom, the owners of land usually furnish
abstracts of title to prospective grantees or mortgagees;$ and it
seems to .be the opinion of several text writers that the duty de12 L" R. A.. N. S. 449, 12 Ann. Cas. 407;
:i8 Tenn. 678. 102 S. W. 9o,
Bremerton Dev. Co. v, Title Trust Co., 67 Wash. 268, 121 Pac. 69; Land etc. Co. v.
Rutland, - Tex. Civ. A. -, 18S S. W. zo64.
'Mechanics' Building Ass'n v. Whiteacre,- 92 Ind. S47; Houseman v. Girard, etc.
Adn, 8% Pa. St. 2j6.
3In re Stamford etc. Banking Co., x Ch. 587, 6g L J. Ch. i6, 8z L. T. Rep. N. S.
708; Poppleton v. Buchanan, 4 C. B. N. S. 20, 4 Jur. N. S. 414, 27 L. J. C. P. 210, 93
E. C. L. 20; 43 L I. A. N. S. 46, Note.
'Condolly v. Pierce, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 1z; Carpenter v. Brown, 6 Barb. (N. Y.)
149; Brewer v. Fox, 6z IU. App. 609; Chapman v. Lee, S5 Ala. 66.
I Tapp v. Nock, 89 Ky. 414, IZ S. W. 713; Espy v. Anderson, 14 Pa. St. 308; Smith
Thompson v. Robinson, 65
v. Flatonia Nat. Bank, 43 Tex. Civ. A. 495, 95 S. W. iiii;
W. Va. $o6, 65 S. E 3 718, 17 Ann. Cas. ziog; Easton v. Montgomery, go Cal. 307, 27
Pac. ago, 25 Am. St. Rep. 123; McQuary v. Mo. Land Co., 230 Mo. 34., I3O S. W. 335;
392, 99 N. E. 684, 43 L. R..A. N. S. 44.
Eiche v. Keonka, 2S5 Ill.
sEaston v. Montgothery, go Cal. 313, 27 PaC. 280; WARvar.. ON VENDORS, (2nd Ed.),
etc. Co.,

1

290.
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volves upon he mortgagor to bear the expenses of searching the
title, upon the ground that the mortgagee is entitled to the full
amount of his loan and interest, without discount for expenses in9
curred in preparing the security and ascertaining its value.
Harshness of General Rule.-As Chief Justice Black trenchantly
has said: "It is very well known that the owner of real estate seldom incurs the expense of procuring an abstract of the title from
the abstracter, except for the purpose of thereby furnishing information to some third person or persons who are to be influenced by
the information thus provided. If the abstracter in all cases be
responsible only to the person under whose employment he performs
the service, it is manifest that the loss occasioned thereby must in
10
many cases, if not in most cases, be remediless."
the bitter condemprovoking
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general
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of title to certain land. The abstracter knows, as a matter of fact,
that the owner seldom wishes or needs it for his own information.
He knows the owner, because of custom, contract, or other legal
duty, customarily exhibits such abstract to a third person contemplating the acquisition of some interest in the land. He knows also
that such third person customarily relies upon. the abstract. Yet
when the third person, acting with the prudence generally exercised
by those in his position and in harmonr. with general cusiom, is
injured by his reliance thereon, because the abstracter has failed to
exercise due care and skill in his work, the abstracter escapes all
liability, for the reason that the owner, not being misled, isn't injured; and the third party who is injured isn't in privity of contract
with him. Such a state of affairs is a reproach to the la,. It may
be remedied by legislation; but legislation is slow and capricious. and.
it should be cured, if possible, by an enlightened application of the
common law.
Reaction of Modern Courts.-The view taken by a majority of the
courts respecting. an abstracter's liability makes his profession a
comparatively safe proposition; but it is not calculated to develop
carefulness or accuracy therein. Considering the tremendous interests at stake, the legal conclusion reached is not good public policy.
It fosters a dangerous illusion of security, likely to result iii imIMAUPIN
Aas.

ON MARnTABLE TITLES To RFAL ESTATr, 2nd Ed..

9 and WILLAhlD o-.

i

73. citing MART. ON

RFAL EsT. AND CONV. 5.9.

10 Brown v. Sis, 22 Ind. A. 37,

53 N. E. 779, 72 Am. St. Rep. 3o8.
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mense losses. It renders everyday piactices unsafe. Consequently,
it is not surprising to find modem judicial thought, which is adopting "the ethical standard of reasonable conduct"' 1 as a criterion of
legal liability, protesting against the rigor of the rule limiting the
liability of the abstracter to those in strict privity of contract with
him. In Y912 the Supreme Court of -Washington, referring to the
rule laid down in I Cyc 215, said:

"We are not willing to apply it, unless it is plain that there was
no duty on the part of the abstracter to the party injured.*** What
is called the general rule has not been allowed to stand without
strong and persistent challenge. In one of the leading cases, Savi-gs
.Bank v. Wlard, ioo U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621, the doctrine was denied by Chief Justice Waite, dissenting, with whom Justices Swain
and Bradley concurred. He said: 'The circumstances were such
as odght to have satisfied him that his certificate was to be used by
Chapman in some transaction with another person as evidence of the
fact certified to.*** It seems to me that under these circumstances
Ward is liable to the bank for any loss it may sustain by reason of
his erroneous certificate.' Like expressions are to be found in many
of the cases. In some other states the injustice of the rule invoked
by plaintiff has been- recognized by the legislature and abrogated
by statute.*** The'general rule was recognized, if not expressly
affirmed, in Bremerton Development Cbmpany v. Title Trust Conpany, 67 Wash. 268, 121 Pac. 69, where a recovery was allowed
upon our finding of strict privity of contract; but it does not follow
that there are no exceptions to the rule. Indeed, they have been
recognized and,
in our judgment, are as securely established as the
12
rule itself.'
Exceptions to the GeneralRule.--Let us now notice the exceptions
to the general rule that have received judicial sanction, and then
consider whether the formulation of theories for a broader liability
of the abstracter in contract and in tort is' possible. The exceptions
differing from each other for the most part only in slight degree, are
as follows:
(i)
Where there is fraud or collusion on the part of an abstracter he will be held liable to third parties, even .though there is no
privity of contract; but where there is neither fraud nor collusion
nor privity of contract, a party will not be held liable, unless the act
11 Law & Moralsfi-

H-Akv. L. REv. '99.
IsAnde"o.x v. "priesteribach et ui., 69 Wash. 393, x25 Pae. x66, 42 L. R. A.
X. S. .76.
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is one imminently dangerous to the lives of others, or is an act
3
performed in pursuance of some legal duty."
(2) " An abstract company which undertakes, at the instance of
the buyer of land, to examine, correct and complete an abstract
made for the seller, after it is informed that he contemplated the
purchase and would rely on the title as shown in the abstract, is
liable to the purchaser. The company in this case insisted that if it
reaffirmed and recertified the abstract as found by the lower court,
it did so gratuitously and therefore no contractual tie was created
between it and the purchaser. But the court declared:
"It seems to us that the legal effect of facts 'found as stated was
to show the existence of a valid contract between appellant and Rutland. The former performed service at his request. Even if the
latter had not agreed to pay the former for the service the law would
imply an undertaking on his part to do so. If appellant might, when
it performed the service, have demanded of Rutland that he pay it
a reas'onable sudi therefor, the fact that, waiving its right, it did not
do so, would not relieve it of the obligation it incurred when it
undertook to pass upon the correctness and completeness of the
abstract presented to it?""
(3) A purchaser of land requiring the vendor to furnish an
abstract of title is entitled to maintain an action against the abstracter for defects of title omitted in the abstract, where the abstracter
15
knows that such abstract is procured for his use. Should the purchaser decline to purchase until furnished an abstract at the expense
of the'vendor, it has been held in effect that there is privity of contract between him and the abstracter.1
(4) If an attorney, knowing that the lender is relying upon him
in his professional capacity to see that her mortgage is the first lien,
although the borrower is to pay the fees, undertakes to perform this,
duty, he is bound to do it with ordinary and reasonable skill and care
and is liable for negligence in that respect, under the principle settled
in Coggs v. Barnard.17 This conclusion seems based upon the view
U National Satings Bank v. Ward, zoo U. S. igS, 25 L. ed. 62r; citing Langridge v.
Levy, a Mces. & W., 519, 530. Accord, Peabody Bldg. etc. Assn', v. Houseman, 89 Pa.
St. 26t," 33 Am.

Rep. 757.

14Land, etc. Co. v. Rutland, - Tex. Civ. A.- , z85 S. W..x064. Accord, Dickle v.
Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 24 Am. St. Rep. 616; Siewcrs v. Coammonwealth, 87 Pac.
St. IS.

UDenton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. .20, 79 S. W. 799.
26Dickle v. Nashville Absract Co., 89 Tenn. 432, 14 S. W. 896, 24 Am. St. Rep. 6z6.
'it i Ld. Raym. 909, x Smith's Lead. Cas. Eq. z9g.
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that there was evidence in the case from which a jury might find the
relation of attorney dnd client between the defendant and the lender.
"Even adverse interests," the court said, "if to be amicably adjusted,
8
may be represented by the same counsel."'
Where a borrower informs a title -company that, in o, er
(5)
to secure a loan, it is necessary for him to have a certificate that
certain land is not incumbered, and the company delivers it to the
borrower, who pays for it, the mortgagee-who relies on it may recover upon contract from the abstracter. Here the court said:
"The sole contention of the demurrant is that the count discloses
no privity of contract between it and the plaintiff, but only a contract
between it and Moore (the mortgagor). But this is too narrow a
view of the transaction set out in this count. Upon its averments
there is disclosed either a contract between plaintiff and defendant,
made through the agency of Moore, by which defendant was employed to examine and certify the title, or a contract of like employment between Moore and defendant, made for the bienefit of plaintiff
"upon which a right of action by plaintiff would arise."'"
(6) An abstracter of title employed by a landowner desiring to
obtain a loan to make an abstract of title to property is liable for his
negligence to the lender who, before making the loan, informs the
abstracter that he shall rely entirely upon his abstract and is assured by the latter, who delivers him the abstract, that he can do
so.2 0 In holding that, where there is an arrangement between a loan
association and an abstract company that abstracts are to be furnished at the expense of borrowers, the abstracter may be liable to
the loan association as a privy, the Supreme Court of Montana
said: "Privies are defined as persons connected together in the same
action or thing by some relation other than that of actual contract
between them." 21
(7) If a lawyer, employed to examine and certify to the recorded
title of real property, gives his client a certificate which he knows
or ought to know is to be used by the client in some business transaction with another person as evidence of the facts certified to, he
is-liable to such other person relying on his certificate for any loss
resulting from his failure to find on record a conveyance affecting
3Lawall v. Groman, 18o Pa. St. 532, 57 Am. St. Rep. 662.
"'Economy.Bldg. etc. Assoc. v. West Jersey Title Co., 6.
4 N.

3.

L. 27, 44 At.

854.

See Cann v. Willson, L.. R. 39, Ch Div. 39.

Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind. A. 3z7, 53 N. E. 779, 72 Am. St. Rep. 308.
Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Silver Bow Abstract Co., 31 MOnt. 448, 78 Pac.
774. 107 Am. St. Rep. 435. citing BLAcx's LAw DiCTIONARY, 940.
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the use of ordinary professional care and skill he
the title, which by 22
might have found.
These exceptions to the general rule show it is the growing conviction of modem judges that when an abstracter, before he certifies, recertifies, or verbally affirms the correctness of his abstract,
definitely knows that a specific third party not in privity of contract
with him will rely upon such abstract, he is liable to such party when
he does rely to his injury upon such abstract which is erroneous for
lack of legal care and skill in its preparation. So far so good. But
why should the same conclusion not be reached when the abstracter,
!nstead of definitely knowing that a specific third party will rely
upon his abstract, ought in common experience to know that some
person dealing with the one ordering the abstract will rely upon it?
Such person should have a remedy. "If there are no authorities
which grant one it is high time for such an authority."28
Development of the Law.-Unless modified by legislation, any
legal conclusion so strongly established as that respecting the persons
to whom an abstracter is liable, must, on account of judicial conservatism, change slowly. Yet the doctrine of stare decisis is -declining in favor ;24 it does not strictly necessitate an adherence to the
old rule touching the liability of abstracters, because it is not one. of
property ;25 and the present exceptions to the general rule indicate
its'gradual disintegration by the erosion of judicial distinctions and
discriminations. In this there is nothing new. The law has rightly
put its ideals of justice higher than considerations of scientific consistency.2 8 There is no finality about law and we need not sigh over
T
the fact. Where there is life and growth there can be no finality.
The progress of law, as the development of the human body, is zigzag. Public opinion and agitation render one branch of law more
consonant with justice than others, which lag behind. Consequently,
the reasoning of cases in one field some times differs from that in
others. Let us see, therefore, whether there is analogy for holding
that an abstracter who has furnished an abstract to a landowner is
liable to a third party who relies upon the abstract to his injury.
22Dissenting opinion. C. J. Waite and Swayne and Bradiley, JJ., National Savings
.
Bank v Ward, ioo U. S. 195, as L. ed. 6as. Accord, Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69
Wash. 393, 125 Pac. z66, 42 L R. A. N. S. 176.
U Ketterer v. Armour & Company, zoo Fed. 322.
H3 Mxcii. L. REv. 89.
' 11 Cyc. 749; 7 R. C. L., p. xoo8.

"Smaarr's Foumn^Ttoms ov L.A.L LiAsZLITY-Introduction, p. 2S.
"Preface. Mew's Eng.. $:ase Law Digcst-Supplement 1898-3907.
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Rationale of Contract Liability. -It has been stated that in the
exceptional cases, in which courts have sought to mitigate the rigor
of the general rule, that object has been accomplished by straining
the doctrine of privity of contract.2" Yet it is submitted that the
general contract liability of the abstracter to third parties may be
maintained without this result on the theory (A) that the landowner
is an agent of the third party to procure the abstract for him; (B)
that the abstracter promises to make the abstract for the benefit of
the third party; or (C) that the abstracter breaks an implied warranty running with his abstract.
(A) Let us consider the case where the landowner promises
to procure an abstract for the benefit of a third party. Although
consideration is not necessary to the existence of an executed
agency, 29 there is consideration in this case, because the agreement of
the third party to buy the land or to accept a mortgage on it, is
predicated upon the owner's promise to procure an abstract of it.
If the *owner procures it by the "authority" of the third party, he is
his agent, whether the parties realize it or not.80 "Authority" is the
lawful delegation of power however informal by one person to
another.31 Even in a criminal case, where strict construction should
be the rule, it has been held that where a person requested a saloon
keeper to keep money gratuitously for him in a safe until a following day and the saloon keeper appropriated the money to his own
use, he was an agent of the former party. 2 How much more, theft,
is the landowner an agent of his prospective vendee or mortgagee,
who not only has requested the landowner to procure an abstract for
him, but for a consideration has made it his duty to do so.
The fact that the abstracter is unaware of the agency is immaterial. As the Supreme Court of Iowa has said: "There was
evidence showing that Walters and Wadsworth were acting as the
agents of the plaintiff in procuring an extension of the abstract.
It is true that their agency may not have been disclosed by their
action or by the nature of the transaction, but such disclosure was
Thomas v. Guaranty Title, etc. Co., 8z Oh. St. 432, 92 N. E. z83, 26 L. R. A.
N. S. 1zio.
z HA.sauys LAws or ENGLAND, p. 193.
"3z Cye. xz2r6; 2z R C. L. p. 8i;
'Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, - Tex. -, 2 L. R. A. 405; 31 Cyc. 1z89; CLARK & SKYr4S
ON THz LAw or AGKNCY, § x.
21 z BouviER LAw Dimc. 299; x HALSBlY'S LAws or ECI.AND, pp. zs6-z57.
32 Wynegar v. State, I57 Ind. 577,. 62 N. E. 38, See State v. Smith, S7 Kan. 657,
47 P2e. 535; Schneider v. Schneider, 22S Jo. 1, 98 N. W. z5g; Garvey v. Scott,, 9 IIl.
App. 1g; Economy Building etc. Ass'n v. West N. Jersey Title Co., 64 N. J. L. 27, 44

AtL 854.

LIABILITY OF ABSTRACTERS

not necessary to create liability on the part of the -defendant. If the
agency -in fact existed, -the abstract was furnished for the plaintiff,
and he was liable to the defendant for the service rendered, whether
the defendant knew him as a principal or not. Being liable for this
service, he is entitled to reciprocal rights against the defendant, and
may maintain this ;iction, subject to any defense which the defendant might have interposed.against the agents."8 8
. It must be admitted that this theory of agency can be maintained
only on the analogy of extreme cases. But it is possible for the
courts, in- order to do justice, to find the existence of agency on a
slight basis of*ascertained facts. And it would seem that if the
prospective vendee or mortgagee stipulates in his contract with the
landowner thatthe latter, as his agent, is to procure the abstract for
him, there could be no reasonable doubt of the fact of agency.
(B) Where a landowner promises to procure an abstract for a
prospective vendee or mortgagee, it.clearly is for the latter's benefit.
Such vendee or mortgagee is the real party in interest and, as such,
should be allowed to sue the abstracter, in jurisdictions allowing the
real party in interest to sue." By the" great weight of American
authority, a third party may enforce a promise made for his benefit,
although he is a stranger both to the contract and to the consideration.3. The fact that the particular person who is to benefit from
the promise is not known, or is uncertain, when the promise is made
and even that he does not know -of the promise in his favor when it
s
is made, is immaterial. He may sue for the breach of it.3
Thus,
where a purchaser of property sold at a receiver's sale enters into a
written agreement under seal with the receiver to pay the expenses
of the final accounting of the latter, the receiver's attorney may
maintain an action against the purchaser for. his services in such
final proceedings, although he had not been retained by the receiver
when the contract was made.3 7 Likewise we may say, when an abstracter promises a landowner to furnish him an abstract which the
landowner is bound to give to a third party, although unknown, 'and
when the abstracter knows, or in common experience ought to
know, it is to be given to such third party, then the abstracter's promise is for the latter's benefit.
33 Young v. Lohr, r8

Iowa 624,

92 N.

W.

684, citing MECHEm'S AGENcy,

1 769;

z Am. & ENG. EN&. LAw, and ed., iz68.
3 6 R. C. L., p. 885.
6 R. C. L., p. 884; 13 C. J. 705.
13 C. J. 711.
3Traver v. Snyder, 35 Misc. 261, 71 N. Y. S. 7 61, affirmed, 69 N. Y S. S5o.
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In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Washington, it appears
that a landowner, Huston, leased land to Fuhrman for a rental of
one-third'of the crops. Fuhrman purchased.wheat from the defendant with which to seed the land. This wheat was unfit for
spring sowing-the purpose for which the defendant knew Fuhrman bought it. Huston and Fuhrman jointly sued the defendant,
who demurred on. the ground, inter alia,that the sale was made to
Fuhrman only, and that no privity of contract existed between Huston and defendant. It does not appear that the defendant knew of
the lease between Huston and Fuhrman. In allowing Huston to
recover, the court said: "Although the appellant sdld the seed wheat
to. Fuhrman only, the sale was for the benefit of Huston as well.
He was interested in the prospective crop. A sale of Ivheat unfit for
3 8
use damaged him as directly and positively as it did Fuhrman.
Exactly the same reasoning is apposite where an abstracter furnishes a negligently defective abstract to a landowner under obligation to give it to a prospective vendee or mortgagee, who is damaged
because he relies on it.
(C) - It is possible to hold an abstracter liable to third parties not
in privity of contract with him on the theory that he has breached an
implied warranty respecting the quality of his abstract. One who
engages in the business of making abstracts of title impliedly undertakes that he possesses the requisite skill and knowledge and that
he will exercise. due care and' skill in the performance of his duties
3
and for a failure to do so he will be liable in damages. A warranty
is an express or implied statement of 'something which a party undertakes shall be a collateral part of the contract. 0 Implied warranties
arise by operation of law and they exist without any intention of the
seller to create them.41 Hence, the implied undertaking of an abstracter touching his care, knowledge and skill may be considered an
implied warranty that his abstract is impressed with the qualities
resulting from the exercise of the requisite care, knowledge and
skill.
It is true that the benefit of a warranty of a chattel is not ordinarily available to any except the immediate vendee. However, the
view has been taken as regards the sale of canned or bottled food
"Fuhrman v. Irterior Warelouse Co., 64 Wash. x59, zx6 Pac. 666, 37 L. R. A.

. S. 89.
C. j. .368.
z

24 R. C. L., p. 1s3.
4 R. C. L., p. 178.
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products that the manufacturer under modern conditions impliedly
warrants his goods when dispensed in original packages, and such
warranty is available to all who may be damaged by reason of their
2
use 'inthe legitimate channels of trade:'
It may be observed that cained or bottled food products are not
per se articles of an imminently dangerous nature. True, when
impure, they may produce serious injury or death; but so may defective engines, paint, carriages, soft drinks, shot guns, and engine oil;8
and such articles have been considered not imminently dangerous.'
Hence, the liability of an abstracter may well fall under the exception
of canned and bottled products.
, The layman is as-unable personally to investigate the accuracy of
an abstract as he is personally to determine the purity of canned
or bottled products. The extension of the liability of manufacturers
of canned.or bottled products is because it is unreasonable to require the consumer to have them chemically analyzed every time they
are used. It is submitted that it is equally unreasonable to require
a third party using an abstract to invoke professional assistance to
ascertain its accuracy. Where the reason for a rule has ceased, a
new rule should be applied that will more nearly harmonize with
what is reasonable and just. This-has been done in the case of
canned and bottled products." Why should it not be done also in
the case of abstracts? It is true that the impure canned or bottled
products inflict physical damage, wlereas a defective abstract inflicts pecuniary damage, but the law recognizes the actionable nature
of each.45
Rationale of Tort Liability.-Although it is commonly said that an
action against an abstracter is based on contract and not on tort,"
it appears as easy to develop a tort basis for his liability to third
parties as a contract one. In cases where an abstracter has conspired with a landowner to omit incumbrances from the abstract in
4324

R. C. L., p. x6o.

433 otes, :9 L. R. A. N. S. 923; 48 L. R. A. N. S.

2X.

=,
" Ketterell v. Armour & Co., 200 Fed. 322; Maefte v. Armour & Co., - Wash.
95 At].
135 Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. N. S. 2x3; Capton v. SWift & Co., 251 Pa. St. 52,
931-, L R. A. 1917B 1272.
4
Marette v. Armour & Co., - Wash. -, 13S Pac. 633, 48 L. R. A. N S. 213.
"Russell v. Po~k Co. Abstract Co., 87 10. 233, 54 N. W. 212, 43 Am. St. Rep. 381;
Thomas v. Guarantee Title etc. Co., Si Oh. St. 432, 91 N. E. 183, 26 L. R. A. N. S.
Eq. Build. etc. Assoc. v. Bank of Commerce etc. Co., :z8 Tenn. 678, 102 S. W.
1210;
S. 824;
901, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 449; Lockwood v. Title Ins. Co. of N. Y., 130 N. Y.Bremerton Devel. Co. v. Title Trust Co., 67yWash. 268, 121 Pac. 69.
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order to mislead a prospective vendee or mortgagee, his tort liability
47
to the misled party is unquestionable.
But the theory of tort liability is broad enough to embrace cases of
simple negligence on the part of the abstracter. A tort, as Mr. Justice Holmes has said in substance, is a wrong which consists in the
infliction of temporal damage by a responsible person under circumstances of such nature that the person inflicting the damage knows,
or in common experience ought to know, that his conduct is likely to
result in harm.4 8 No branch of law is developing more rapidly than
that of tort; and it develops through the judicial recognition of legal
duties heretofore unexpressed. As early as 1896 Judge Vann declared: "As was recently said by this court in an action then without precedent, 'If the most that can be said is that the case is novel,
and is not brought plainly within the limits of some adjudged case,
we think such facts not enough to call for a reversal of the judgment."' The question therefore is not whether there is any precedent for the action, but whether the defendant inflicted such a wrong
upon the plaintiff as resulted in lawful damages."110
The general tort liability of an abstracter to third parties not in
privity of contract with him may be maintained on the theory (A)
of deceit for fraudulent representations or (B) of case for negligent
representations.
(A) In considering an abstracter's responsibility the Supreme
Court of Idaho said: "Although a misrepresentation is made
through mistake of the facts as they actually exist, when such misrepresentation is made by one whose duty it is to know the facts and
who represents himself as possessing all the facts with reference to
the matter, the misrepresentation is in law equally as fraudulent and
actionable as if it had been knowingly made.""1
True, in this case the court was considering an abstracter's liability to one who had ordered and paid for the abstract. Yet the matter
of primary importance is that the court found that this liability,
even in the absence of positive fraud, might be considered tortious,
upon the principle announced in i842 by Chief Justice Tindal, "the
4Nat. Say. Bank v. Ward, ioo U. S. 195, 2s L. ed 62zr; Dundee Mortg. etc. Co. v.
Hughes, 2o Fed. 39; Cooley on Torts, 3rd ed., pp. 938"944; 12 R. C. L., p. 402.
4The Path of the Law, zo HAiv. LAw Rav. 457, 47r.
4 Piper v. Hoard, 107 N. Y. 73, x3' N. E. 626.
0Kueck v. Goldman, zSo N. Y. x78, 44 AtL 773.
n Hillock et al. v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 Pac. 6r2, 42 L. R A.
N. S. 178, citing Fisher v. Mellen, 703 Mass. S03; Smith on Fraud, § 2. See also
Gerner v. Mosher, S8 Neb. 13S, 46 L. R. A. 244; Watson v. Jones, 4 Fla. 241; 25
So. 678.
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that duty, or noncontract creates a duty, and the neglect to perform
5 2
a tort.
feasance, is a ground of action upon

1

It remains now to consider whether the fraud of an abstracter
entitles a third party injured thereby, but not in privity of contract
with him, to recover. from him. The abstracter "in common experience. ought to know that his conduct is likely to result in harm" to
others than his employer, although they are not specifically called to
his attention. This is a fact of universal recognition; it has been
given vigorous judicial expression ;53 and the courts have no more
right dogmatically to deny it than they have to impugn the actionable
nature of all mental anguish unconnected with unlawful physical
impact-a position from which they are now receding." When the
courts cease to maintain a position contrary to fact, and consider
whether or not an abstracter "knows that his conduct is likely to result in harm" to third parties, they must then recognize that third
parties often may have a tort action against an abstracter, agreeable
to the above .criterion of Mr. Justice Holmes.
It is true the Supreme Court of Ohio, in denying the tort liability
of abstracters, said, "The argument founded upon certain classes
of decisions, designated as sub-vendee cases, telegraph cases, timetable cases, professional cases, and director cases, does not impress
us as possessing any relevance to the issue here. Those decisions
public, nature inherent in the
are founded upon a public, or quasi
55
business or transactions involved."
There is, however, no "public, or quasi public nature" inherent
in transactions where one gives his financial standing to commercial
agencies which transmit it to the public, or where statements of
officers are inserted in prospectuses, bonds, or reports oi private
companies, which-influence the public. Yet it has been held that representations made to a commercial agency having general authority
to publish them may be relied on by others'than patrons who have
rightfully come into possession of the information." Original stockholders who make false statements as to the amount of capital stock
paid into the corporation cannot escape libbility to its creditors who
ToiTs, 3rd
'"Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q. B. (Ad. & E. N. S.) six. See BURDICK ox
ed., p. xx; CooL~y cmxToRTS, 3rd e&, pp. x55-x6o.
uBrown v. Sims, 22 Ind. 317, 53 N. E. 779, 72 Am. St. Rep. 3o8.
ox TORTS, 3rd ed., pp. 213-125; 17 C. J. 8W8-843.
"Biinmc
A.
"Thoma v. Guarantee Title & T. Co.. 81 Oh. St. 432, 9z N. E. x83, 26 L. R.
N. S. 1210.
C. A. 24, 3o L. R. A. N. S.
'aDavis v. Lou.ville Trust Co., x8i Fed. 1o, 104 C.
X01; 12 IL C. L.r, p. 366.
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become such after a: transfer of such stock.5 7

The president of a

company who has signed corporate bonds containing a false representation is liable in deceit to one who takes them as collateral security relying upon the representation, although the president is not
personally connected with'this particular transaction. 8 A bank also
is liable for a fraudulent statement in its cashier's certificate respecting the paid-up capital of an insurance company to persons buying,
from original subscribers, worthless stock of the insurance company
in reliance on this statement. 9 These cases show that in imposing
liability for fraud the courts, in the interest of justice, have flot
insisted upon privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant.
The principle deducible from them is that where the defendant has
made a fraudulent statement under circumstances where he knows,
or is likely to know, that it will result in harm to third persons reasonably relying on it, he must respond in damages to those who have
relied on it to their injury. Every consideration of public policy
demands that abstracters should be subject to this principle; and the
above cases and others similar are authority for so holding.
(B) In disapproving the result reached in the Ohio case previously mentioned, 0 where the court somewhat sneeringly rejected
the contention that an abstracter is liable in tort to a third party who
relies, to -his injury upon a negligently defective, abstract, the
author of a note in the Harvard Law Review86 ably maintains that
the abstracter i liable on the theory of nfegligent misrepresentation.
In part he says:
"The problem depends on whether or not there is a duty to use
care as to the accuracy of representations. Undoubtedly such a
duty does not exist under all circumstances, biit a review of the
decisions'.-makes it equally certain that at times such a duty does
exist. There may be a duty imposed by statute, as in the case of
recording clerks. Then if the clerk negligently fails to record a mortgage he is liable to a plaintiff who relied on the record to his damage. 2 And apart from statute, in this country telegraph companies
are considered to owe such a duty to the public that the recipient of
a telegram may recover for losses caused by negligent mistakes made
InMcBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., i3o Mich.
Rep. 453.
33Stickel v. Atwood, 25 R. I. 456, S6 At]. 687.

N.

iiz,

89. N. W.

683,

97 Am. St.

Hindman v. First Nat. Bk. of'Loui'ville, 98 Fed. 562, 48 L. IL A. 21o.
Thomas-v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 8z Oh. St. 432, 91 N. E. 183, 26 L. IL A.
S. 1210.
'n z HAxv. L. REv. 439. See 14 -AV. L. Rrv. x84-99.
"Appleby v. State, 45 N. J. L. x6x.
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of duty
The courts also find there is a breach
in transmission.
6
An at'
others.
of
lives
the
imperils
misrepresentation
the
where
repmaking
in
tempt has been made to confine the duty to use care
to
dangerous
resentations to cases where 'the act is one imminently
legal
some
of
pursuance
in
the lives of others or is an act performed
not
duty.'6 5 Other decisions, however, show that this limitation is
there
whom
with
persons
to
liable
held
sound. Physicians have been
of negligent opinions which
was no privity of contract for the results
6" It has even been held that
life.
to
dangerous
were not imminently
a druggist is similarly liable for negligently and falsely representing
7
The position of the abstract company can
a hair tonic as harmless.
be distinguished only on the ground that the damage.caused is pecunIn
iary instead of physical, and such a distinction seems untenable.
statement;
the
on
relying
in
both cases the plaintiffs were reasonable
in both the defendants knew persons such as the plaintiff would rely
on the statements and would probably be damaged if the statements
were false. It is submitted, therefore, that a similar duty to use care
should be imposed on the defendants in both cases." In attempting to formulate theories of liability of abstracters in
contract "and in tort broader than those usually recognized in the
exceptions to the general rule, it has been necessary to reason from
principle and analogy. In some cases the decisions used for purposes
of comparison conflict with others. But if the principle of a decided
case leads to the advocated conclusion, it should le adopted by courts
believing in the decided case. The purpose of this discussion is to
provoke thought that may lead to additional mitigation of the general rule giving abstracters, in most cases, unjust immunity from
legal liability. Should the courts further extend the accountability
of abstracters, it will be necessary to determine whether it is confined to the persoh first dealing with the landowner who secures the
abstract, or whether it extends to others.
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